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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Nebraska Supreme Court created a new procedure by
which defendants can move to withdraw their guilty pleas after their
conviction has become final—the common-law motion to withdraw a
plea.1  In State v. Gonzalez (Gonzalez II), Alma Gonzalez moved to
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
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withdraw her no contest plea, alleging that she had received ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel because her attorney had not explained the
immigration consequences of her conviction.2  The court looked at the
two existing methods by which Gonzalez could withdraw her plea and
determined that neither applied.3  The court then concluded that
there was another method that might have been available to Gonza-
lez—a common-law motion.4  The court had alluded to the possibility
of such a procedure in a previous case,5 but never actually recognized
a common-law motion to withdraw a plea as a valid procedure, nor
had the court articulated the “scope and parameters” governing when
defendants could bring such a motion.6  In Gonzalez II, the court
briefly articulated the scope and parameters of the common-law mo-
tion.  The procedure “is available in extremely limited circum-
stances.”7  It is only available in cases where “(1) the [Postconviction]
Act is not, and never was, available as a means of asserting the
ground or grounds justifying withdrawing the plea and (2) a constitu-
tional right is at issue.”8
Because the common-law motion was not available to Gonzalez,
the court did not explain the details of the procedure.9  Since Gonza-
2. Id. at 940, 830 N.W.2d at 505.  Nebraska statutes allowing the entry of such a
plea refer to a plea of “nolo contendere.” See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1819 to 29-
1819.03 (Reissue 2008).  Trial courts sometimes refer to pleas of nolo contendere
as “no contest” pleas.  State v. Obst, 12 Neb. Ct. App. 189, 191, 669 N.W.2d 688,
691 (2003).  The terms can be used interchangeably because they “have the same
meaning, with no difference in their connotation, and both terms are regularly
used to convey the same concept.” Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1069, 1070
(7th ed. 1999)).
3. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 944–46, 830 N.W.2d at 507–09.
4. Id. at 948, 830 N.W.2d at 510.
5. Id.; see State v. Yos-Chiguil, 278 Neb. 591, 595, 772 N.W.2d 574, 578 (2009) (“Be-
cause the issue was not presented to us [in State v. Rodriguez-Torres, 275 Neb.
363, 746 N.W.2d 686 (2008)], we did not address whether a common-law remedy
existed for withdrawal of the plea in that circumstance.”).  The Court did not ref-
erence such a procedure in State v. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 251 N.W.2d 737 (1977),
but later concluded the case also supported a common-law motion to withdraw a
plea by addressing the defendant’s argument on its merits even though it was a
collateral attack on his conviction. See Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 947, 830 N.W.2d
at 509–10 (recalling that in Kluge the court had noted the American Bar Associa-
tion Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty allowed a defendant to withdraw his or
her plea whenever the defendant filed a timely motion proving that withdrawal
was necessary to correct a manifest injustice).
6. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 948, 830 N.W.2d at 510 (observing that neither Kluge
nor Yos-Chiguil explained the “scope and parameters” of the common-law
procedure).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 949–50, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
9. Id. at 950, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
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lez, the court has only addressed the procedure four times10 and has
not yet clearly defined how long after conviction defendants may move
to withdraw their plea using the common-law procedure.  This Note
will propose that Nebraska courts apply the timing requirements from
the Nebraska Postconviction Act (the Act),11 because the common-law
procedure was created as an alternative for defendants who could not
bring postconviction motions under the Act.12  Part II will provide
background on how defendants could withdraw their pleas in Ne-
braska prior to the creation of the common-law motion.  Part III will
discuss Gonzalez and the limitations the opinion placed on the com-
mon-law motion to withdraw a plea.  Part IV will discuss cases involv-
ing common law motions to withdraw pleas since Gonzalez—none of
which include a discussion on when a motion is considered timely—
and will propose timing requirements that should guide when defend-
ants can raise common law motions.  Part V will conclude the Note.
II. BACKGROUND
Nebraska allows defendants to withdraw their guilty or no contest
plea prior to sentencing.13  Defendants may withdraw their pleas, at
the court’s discretion, “for any fair and just reason” if the prosecution
has not and would not be “substantially prejudiced by its reliance on
the plea.”14  Defendants may also move to withdraw their plea after
sentencing, but before the judgment becomes final for purposes of a
collateral attack.15  Judges shall only allow defendants to withdraw
their plea if the defendant proves that withdrawal is necessary to “cor-
rect a manifest injustice” and establishes the grounds for withdrawal
by clear and convincing evidence.16
After a defendant has been sentenced, however, the primary
method for withdrawing a plea is the Nebraska Postconviction Act.17
A prisoner in custody may file a verified motion asking the court to
vacate or set aside his or her sentence on the ground that the pris-
oner’s rights were denied or infringed to an extent that would render
10. See generally State v. Merheb, 290 Neb. 83, 858 N.W. 2d 226 (2015); State v.
Mamer, 289 Neb. 92, 853 N.W.2d 517 (2014); State v. Osorio, 286 Neb. 384, 837
N.W.2d 66 (2013); State v. Yuma, 286 Neb. 244, 835 N.W.2d 679 (2013).
11. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
12. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 948–49, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
13. State v. Minshall, 227 Neb. 210, 214, 416 N.W.2d 585, 588 (1987).
14. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Roeder, 262 Neb. 951, 959, 636 N.W.2d 870, 877 (2001);
State v. Carlson, 260 Neb. 815, 821, 619 N.W.2d 832, 837 (2000).
15. State v. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 119, 251 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1977).
16. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Holtan, 216 Neb. 594, 599, 344 N.W.2d 661, 665 (1984);
State v. Lewis, 192 Neb. 518, 522, 222 N.W.2d 815, 818 (1974).  For a discussion
of what constitutes a manifest injustice, see infra note 58.
17. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001 (Cum. Supp. 2012).
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the judgment void.18  A prisoner has one year to file his or her motion
for postconviction relief.19  The one-year period runs from one of four
dates:  (1) “[t]he date the judgment of conviction became final by the
conclusion of a direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a
direct appeal,”20 (2) “[t]he date on which the factual predicate of the
constitutional claim or claims alleged could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence,”21 (3) “the date on which an im-
pediment created by state action, in violation of the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of Nebraska or any law of the
state, is removed, if the prisoner was prevented from filing a verified
motion by such state action,”22 or (4) “[t]he date on which a constitu-
tional claim asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court of
the United States or the Nebraska Supreme Court, if the newly recog-
nized right has been made applicable retroactively to cases on post-
conviction collateral review.”23  Additionally, a defendant cannot use a
postconviction motion to secure review of issues of which the defen-
dant knew about and could have litigated at the time of his or her
direct appeal.24
Sections 29-1819.02 and 29-1819.03 provide an alternative method
for a defendant to withdraw a plea after his or her conviction becomes
final.25  Section 29-1819.02 requires that the trial court warn defend-
ants that a conviction might have negative immigration conse-
quences.26  If the court fails to do so, and the defendant shows that
that conviction may result in his or her removal from the United
States, the trial court must vacate the judgment and allow the defen-
dant to withdraw his or her plea and enter a plea of not guilty.27  To
withdraw a plea pursuant to Section 29-1819.02, a defendant must
show only “(1) that the court failed to give all or part of the advisement
18. Id. § 29-3001(1).
19. Id. § 29-3001(4).
20. Id. § 29-3001(4)(a).
21. Id. § 29-3001(4)(b).
22. Id. § 29-3001(4)(c).
23. Id. § 29-3001(4)(d).
24. State v. Lotter, 278 Neb. 466, 478, 771 N.W.2d 551, 561 (2009).
25. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-1819.02, 29-1819.03 (Reissue 2008).
26. Id. § 29-1819.02(1). The section provides that before a judge accepts a guilty or
no contest plea from a defendant, the judge must issue the following advisement:
“IF YOU ARE NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN, YOU ARE HEREBY AD-
VISED THAT CONVICTION OF THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH YOU HAVE
BEEN CHARGED MAY HAVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF REMOVAL FROM
THE UNITED STATES, OR DENIAL OF NATURALIZATION PURSUANT TO
THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES.” Id.
27. Id. Section 29.1819.03 provides the legislative intent behind Section 29-1819.02,
recognizing that often defendants plead guilty or no contest to offenses without
knowing that a conviction for the offense is grounds for removal from the United
States or denial of naturalization.  Requiring that judges warn the defendant of
the possible immigration consequences of their plea “promote[s] fairness.” Id.
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[required by section 29-1819.02(1)] and (2) that the defendant faces an
immigration consequence which was not included in the advisement
he or she received.”28  The defendant is not required to show that he or
she was prejudiced as a result of the plea.29
III. THE GONZALEZ OPINIONS
A. Gonzalez I
In 2007, Alma Gonzalez was arrested for fraudulently obtaining
public assistance benefits in an amount greater than $500, a Class IV
felony carrying a possible penalty of up to five years in prison or a
$10,000 fine.30  Prior to her arrest, the federal government had initi-
ated deportation proceedings against Gonzalez, who was living in the
country illegally.31  Gonzalez pled no contest in early 2008 in ex-
change for the State recommending a term of probation at sentencing
and Gonzalez’s agreement to pay restitution for the benefits that she
had illegally obtained.32  Before accepting her plea, the court warned
her that conviction for the offense could lead to her deportation or de-
nial of her naturalization requests.33  Prior to entering her plea, Gon-
zalez was eligible for a “cancellation of removal,”34 but she became
ineligible as a result of her conviction.35
Gonzalez subsequently filed a “Motion to Withdraw Plea and Va-
cate Judgment” on July 14, 2010, alleging that she had received inef-
fective assistance of counsel.36  At an evidentiary hearing, Gonzalez
testified that she had not discussed the immigration consequences of
her plea with her trial counsel.37  Gonzalez testified that her trial
counsel knew she was not a United States citizen, but that she had not
28. State v. Medina-Liborio, 285 Neb. 626, 630, 829 N.W.2d 96, 99 (2013).
29. Id.
30. State v. Gonzalez (Gonzalez I), 283 Neb. 1, 807 N.W.2d 759 (2012), withdrawn,
285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W.2d 504 (2013).
31. Id. at 3, 807 N.W.2d at 763.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b) (2012).  The Attorney General may cancel the removal of
a nonpermanent resident alien and change the alien’s status to permanent resi-
dent if the alien (a) has been “physically present in the United States for a contin-
uous period” of at least ten years, (b) has been a person of good moral character
during that time, (c) has not been convicted of certain enumerated crimes, and (d)
“establishes that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” for the individual’s “spouse, parent, or child” if the spouse, parent, or
child is a United States citizen or permanent resident alien. Id.  Had she not
been convicted, Gonzalez would have been eligible for a cancellation of removal
because she had relatives in the United States and had been living in the country
for at least ten years. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 4, 807 N.W.2d at 764.
35. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 4, 807 N.W.2d at 764.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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informed her counsel of her ongoing immigration case.38  Gonzalez
said that she would have “looked into other solutions” had she known
that her plea might have immigration consequences.39  However, Gon-
zalez also admitted that she never asked her attorney whether her
plea might cause problems with her immigration status, even though
the immigration consequences of her plea were “very important to
her.”40  Gonzalez stated that she did not learn the consequences of her
plea until she was told by the attorney representing her in her immi-
gration proceedings, about five months before she filed her motion to
withdraw her plea.41  The district court denied Gonzalez’s motion,
finding that her assertion that she would have looked for a different
solution did not satisfy her burden of showing that she was prejudiced
by her counsel’s performance, because finding a different solution was
not in her control.42  The trial court also noted that although Gonzalez
had two attorneys at the time of her plea—her trial counsel and her
immigration attorney—she did not ask either of them about the spe-
cific immigration consequences of her plea, despite her awareness that
her plea might affect her immigration status.43  The district court
found that Gonzalez had failed to prove that she was prejudiced as a
result of her counsel’s failure to warn her about the immigration con-
sequences of her plea and denied her motion.44
On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that there are
three avenues generally available to defendants who claim that they
were not properly advised of the immigration consequences their plea:
(1) a motion for postconviction relief under the Nebraska Postconvic-
tion Act, (2) withdrawing the plea pursuant to Sections 29-1819.02
and 29-1819.03, and (3) a common-law motion to withdraw a plea.45
Only the third option was available to Gonzalez.  Although a defen-





42. Id. at 4–5, 807 N.W.2d at 764.  To determine whether a defendant received inef-
fective assistance of counsel, Nebraska courts use the two-pronged test articu-
lated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland. v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984).  Defendants must show that (1) their counsel’s performance was defi-
cient—that is, “counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordi-
nary training and skill in criminal law in the area,” and (2) their counsel’s
deficient performance actually prejudiced the defendant in his case—that is, “but
for counsel’s deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been
different.”  State v. Davlin, 277 Neb. 972, 976–77, 766 N.W.2d 370, 376 (2009).
43. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 5, 807 N.W.2d at 764.
44. Id.
45. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 5–6, 807 N.W.2d at 765; NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3001.  For a
discussion of withdrawing pleas pursuant to the Act, see supra notes 15–24 and
accompanying text; for a discussion of withdrawing pleas pursuant Sections 29-
1819.02 and 29-1819.03, see supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
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counsel when his or her attorney fails to advise him or her of the im-
migration consequences of his or her plea, Gonzalez did not cite to or
rely on the Act in her motion, nor did she verify her motion as re-
quired by the Act.46  Nor was relief available to Gonzalez under Sec-
tions 29-1819.02 and 29-1819.03, because she received the advisement
required by statute.47  However, the fact that Gonzalez received the
required advisement did not foreclose a common-law remedy of with-
drawal of a plea.48
Prior to Gonzalez I, the Nebraska Supreme Court had never explic-
itly recognized a common-law motion to withdraw a plea.  However,
the court recognized that while it held in State v. Rodriguez-Torres49
that section 29-1819.02 did not create a statutory procedure pursuant
to which a plea entered before the statute was enacted could be with-
drawn after the person convicted of the crime had already served his
sentence, it had also clarified in State v. Yos-Chiguil50 that Rodriguez-
Torres did not foreclose a common-law remedy for withdrawal of a
plea.51
46. Gonzales I, 283 Neb. at 6, 807 N.W.2d at 765.  A motion is “verified” if one “con-
firm[s] or substantiates[s] by oath or affidavit,” or “swear[s] to the truth of” the
motion.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1698 (9th ed. 2009).
47. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 6, 807 N.W.2d at 765.
48. Id.
49. 275 Neb. 363, 746 N.W.2d 686 (2008).  Rodriguez-Torres pled guilty to possession
of a controlled substance in 1997 and was sentenced to two years of supervised
probation. Id. at 364, 747 N.W.2d at 688.  Rodriguez-Torres later pled guilty to a
probation violation and was sentenced to a year in prison. Id. As a result of
these pleas, Rodriguez-Torres became subject to deportation, so he filed a motion
to withdraw his guilty pleas pursuant to NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.02 in 2006.
Id. at 365, 746 N.W.2d at 688.  The court recognized that while Section 29-
1819.02 gives courts discretion to vacate a judgment or withdraw a plea where
the court failed to give the advisement required for pleas made prior to July 20,
2002, the statute does not authorize a court to do so when the defendant has
already completed his sentence. Id. at 367, 746 N.W.2d at 689.  Rodriguez-Torres
failed to directly appeal his convictions or seek postconviction relief, and sought
to withdraw his pleas years after he had already served his sentence. Id.  The
court found that, absent a legislatively authorized procedure allowing Rodriguez-
Torres to withdraw his plea, he had no recourse to do so. Id.
50. 278 Neb. 591, 772 N.W.2d 574 (2009).  The court recalled its decision in Rodri-
guez-Torres that NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.02 did not create a statutory proce-
dure pursuant to which a plea entered before July 2, 2002, could be withdrawn
after the individual convicted of the crime had already served his or her sen-
tence—“[b]ecause the issue was not presented to us, we did not address whether
a common-law remedy existed for withdrawal of the plea in that circumstance.”
Id. at 595, 772 N.W.2d at 578.  The court did not address whether a common-law
remedy was available to Yos-Chiguil, instead finding that Yos-Chiguil did not
allege an essential fact necessary to trigger the remedy provided by Section 29-
1819.02 because he did not allege that he faced the prospect of his application for
naturalization being denied based solely on his conviction that he sought to va-
cate. Id. at 598–99, 772 N.W.2d at 580.
51. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 6–7, 807 N.W.2d at 765.
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The court then observed that it is “well established that a defen-
dant may move to withdraw a plea, even after final judgment,” al-
though it is “quite difficult” for a defendant to prove the grounds for
removal.52  When a defendant moves to withdraw a plea before sen-
tencing, the trial court may allow a defendant to withdraw his or her
plea for any fair or just reason,53 “[b]ut with respect to withdrawal of a
plea of guilty or no contest made after sentencing, withdrawal is
proper only where the defendant makes a timely motion and estab-
lishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that withdrawal is necessary
to correct a manifest injustice.”54  The court stated that this “standard
applies even where a motion to withdraw a plea has been made after
the sentencing court’s judgment has become final.”55  Such a motion is
timely “if made with due diligence, considering the nature of the alle-
gations therein and is not necessarily barred because it was made sub-
sequent to a judgment or sentence.”56
The court concluded that although Gonzalez could have filed a mo-
tion for postconviction relief, she was also permitted to move to with-
draw her plea.57  The court then had to determine whether Gonzalez
had adduced clear and convincing evidence of manifest injustice nec-
essary to justify withdrawing her plea.58
The Nebraska Supreme Court agreed with the district court’s find-
ing that Gonzalez did not prove she was prejudiced by her attorney’s
ineffective assistance in not warning her of the immigration conse-
quences of her plea.59  Most importantly, the court observed, Gonzalez
did not testify that she would have insisted on going to trial had she
52. Id. at 7, 807 N.W.2d at 766.
53. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
54. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 7, 807 N.W.2d at 766 (emphasis added).
55. Id. (citing State v. Holtan, 216 Neb. 594, 344 N.W.2d 661 (1984); State v. Kluge,
198 Neb. 115, 251 N.W.2d 737 (1977)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 8, 807 N.W.2d at 766.
58. Id.  Gonzalez made her motion with due diligence—she filed it shortly after the
U.S. Supreme Court decided Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding
that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is available based upon the im-
migration consequences of a plea). Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 8, 807 N.W.2d at 766.
A defendant may demonstrate manifest injustice in one of four ways, by proving
that: (1) the defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel guaranteed
under the law, (2) the defendant (or a person authorized to act on his or her be-
half) did not enter or ratify the plea, (3) the plea was involuntary, or the defen-
dant entered it without knowing the charge or sentence that could actually be
imposed, or (4) the defendant did not did not receive the charge or sentence con-
cessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecutor failed to seek or
not to oppose the concessions promised in the plea agreement. Id. at 8, 807
N.W.2d at 766–67.  The defendant must also plead and prove that the error re-
sulted in prejudice. Id.
59. Id. at 10, 807 N.W.2d at 768; see supra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
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known that she could be deported.60  Although Gonzalez testified she
would have looked for another solution, she presented no evidence as
to what potential solutions would have been available to her.61  Under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, cancellation of removal is un-
available to any alien who has committed an “aggravated felony.”62
An offense involving “fraud or deceit in which the loss to the vic-
tim . . . exceeds $10,000” is an aggravated felony.63  The court con-
cluded there was “no dispute”64 that Gonzalez committed the crime of
which she was accused or that her conduct fit the description of an
aggravated felony, and could see no way that she could have resolved
her case to avoid the negative immigration consequences of her plea.65
Further, Gonzalez faced a possibility of up to five years in prison,
making the State’s recommendation that she receive probation a
favorable outcome—one that would be rational for a defendant to ac-
cept.66  Gonzalez presented no evidence that, absent her counsel’s al-
legedly deficient performance, she would have insisted on going to
trial.67  Therefore, Gonzalez could not prove the prejudice prong of
Strickland’s ineffective assistance test, and while the district court
had jurisdiction to consider her motion, it did not err in overruling
it.68
60. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 11, 807 N.W.2d at 768.
61. Id.
62. The statute provides “any alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any
time after admission is deportable.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012).  8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C) (2012) gives the Attorney General the authority to cancel the
removal of an alien who meets certain conditions.  To be eligible for a cancellation
of removal, however, the alien cannot have been convicted of an offense under 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2), including that of “aggravated felony.”  8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  See supra note 34 for the four requirements an alien must
meet to be eligible for a cancelation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
63. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(M)(i) (2012).
64. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 11, 807 N.W.2d at 768.  This seems to imply that a defen-
dant must show he or she is actually innocent of the crime in order to demon-
strate prejudice—a proposition that the Nebraska Supreme Court has implied in
other cases as well.  In State v. Krug, 187 Neb. 551, 192 N.W.2d 163 (1971), the
court refused to allow a defendant to withdraw his plea, noting both that the
defendant had not shown with clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor
had failed to keep a promise regarding a sentencing recommendation and that
“the defendant [had] ma[de] no showing that he was innocent.” Id. at 553–54,
192 N.W.2d at 165. See also State v. Lopez, 274 Neb. 756, 764, 743 N.W.2d 351,
358 (2008) (assuming that defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
object to the State’s comment on the defendant’s silence during an interview, but
observing that the defendant still could not establish prejudice where the defen-
dant herself made certain statements suggesting her guilt).
65. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. at 11, 807 N.W.2d at 768 (noting Gonzalez’s argument that
the State might have been willing to craft a creative plea bargain was mere
speculation).
66. Id. at 11, 807 N.W.2d at 769.
67. Id. at 11–12, 807 N.W.2d at 768–69.
68. Id. at 12, 807 N.W.2d at 769.
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B. Gonzalez II
Although the State’s argument prevailed in Gonzalez I, the Ne-
braska Attorney General’s Office filed a motion for rehearing.69  The
State questioned the court’s conclusion that Gonzalez’s motion was
procedurally proper, specifically the court’s decision that there is a
common-law procedure by which a defendant whose sentence has be-
come final may move to withdraw his or her plea.70  After the court
granted the motion for rehearing, the United States Supreme Court
decided Chaidez v. United States,71 which held that Padilla’s rule was
not retroactive. Chaidez made it clear that Gonzalez’s motion had ab-
solutely no merit, but the court issued its opinion in Gonzalez II to
address the issue of whether her motion was procedurally proper.72
The court withdrew its opinion in Gonzalez I and substituted its
opinion issued in Gonzalez II, concluding that “although a very limited
common-law procedure exists, it was unavailable to Gonzalez because
she could have raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under
the Nebraska Postconviction Act.”73  Therefore, the district court
lacked jurisdiction to hear Gonzalez’s motion and the Nebraska Su-
preme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear her appeal.74
In deciding whether the common-law motion was available to Gon-
zalez, the court considered alternative methods she could have used to
69. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. 940, 943, 830 N.W.2d 504, 507 (2013).
70. Id.
71. 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013).  Jose Padilla pled guilty to drug-distribution charges with-
out being warned that he could be deported as a result of his plea. Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010).  In his postconviction motion, Padilla alleged that
his counsel not only failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his
plea, but also incorrectly assured him that he “did not have to worry about his
immigration status since he had been in the country so long.” Id. at 359.  Under
United States immigration laws, a defendant’s removal is “practically inevitable”
if he commits a removable offense (such as a narcotics offense). Id. at 364.  Al-
though the United States Attorney General sometimes has discretion to cancel
removable proceedings, such discretionary relief is generally not available for de-
fendants convicted of trafficking a controlled substance. Id. The United States
Supreme Court found that the consequences of Padilla’s plea could have easily
been determined by reading the removal statute and his counsel gave him incor-
rect advice by falsely assuring him that his conviction would not result in his
removal from the country. Id. at 368–69.  The Court concluded that “[w]hen the
law is not succinct and straightforward . . . a criminal defense attorney need do
no more than advise a noncitizen client that the pending criminal charges may
carry a risk of adverse immigration consequences.  But when the deportation con-
sequence is truly clear, as it was in [Padilla’s] case, the duty to give correct advice
is equally clear.” Id. at 369.  Of course, this only satisfies Strickland’s first
prong—that the defendant’s counsel was deficient. Id. at 369.  The defendant
still needs to show that he was prejudiced as a result of his counsel failing to
warn him about the immigration consequences of his plea. Id.
72. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 943, 830 N.W.2d at 507.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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withdraw her plea.  There are two statutory avenues available for de-
fendants wishing to withdraw their pleas: the Act and section 29-
1819.02.75  Gonzalez did not bring her motion under the Act and con-
tended that the Act was not available to her because she was not “in
custody.”76  However, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that a
prisoner is “in custody” for purposes of the Act not only when they are
incarcerated, but also while on parole77 or while serving a term of
court-ordered probation.78  Because Gonzalez was still serving her
five-year term of probation when she filed her motion, she was in cus-
tody for purposes of the Act.79  Because Gonzalez did not show that
she could not have raised her ineffective assistance of counsel claim
under the Act, the court presumed the Act was available to her.80
The State argued that there was no common-law procedure author-
izing a defendant to withdraw a plea after the conviction had become
final and that the court’s first opinion had incorrectly recognized
one.81  The court agreed that all of the cases it had cited in its original
opinion dealt with motions to withdraw pleas made after sentencing
but before the judgment became final for purposes of a collateral at-
tack, and therefore did not support a finding that a common-law pro-
cedure exists allowing a defendant to move to withdraw a plea after
the conviction has become final.82  However, State v. Kluge still sup-
ported the court’s proposition that the manifest injustice standard ap-
plies even when a defendant motions to withdraw a plea after the
sentencing court’s judgment has become final.83
In Kluge, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea
after he unsuccessfully filed a direct appeal.84  The motion was a col-
lateral attack on his conviction, and although a concurring opinion
challenged the procedural validity of the motion, the court addressed
it on its merits.85  In doing so, the court cited the American Bar Asso-
75. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.02 (Reissue 2008); see supra notes 11–14 and accompa-
nying text.
76. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 945, 830 N.W.2d at 508.
77. State v. Thomas, 236 Neb. 553, 462 N.W.2d 862 (1990).
78. State v. Styskal, 242 Neb. 26, 493 N.W.2d 313 (1992).
79. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 945–46, 830 N.W.2d at 508.  Gonzalez argued that she
was in federal custody when she filed her motion and thus, the Act was unavaila-
ble to her. Id. at 946, 830 N.W.2d at 508.  Declining to decide whether a defen-
dant can bring a state postconviction action while in federal custody, the court
found it did not matter because Gonzalez neither pled nor proved she was in fed-
eral custody for the entire one-year period following Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356 (2010). Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 946, 830 N.W.2d at 509.
80. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 946, 830 N.W.2d at 509.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 947, 830 N.W.2d at 509 (citing State v. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 251 N.W.2d
737 (1977)).
84. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 251 N.W.2d 737.
85. Id.
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ciation Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, noting that Standard
14-2.1(b) allowed a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea “whenever” he
or she “upon timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is
necessary to correct a manifest injustice.”86  Further, the court had
more recently alluded to a common-law procedure in Yos-Chiguil.87
The court then concluded that Kluge and Yos-Chiguil recognize a com-
mon-law procedure for withdrawing a plea after a conviction has be-
come final, and explained the scope and parameters of that
procedure.88
First, the procedure is civil, not criminal, and is available “in ex-
tremely limited circumstances.”89  The court reasoned that the Legis-
lature intended the Act to be the primary procedure for bringing
collateral attacks based on constitutional principles.90  This intent is
evidenced by the Legislature’s statement that the Act is “not intended
to be concurrent with any other remedy existing in the courts of the
state” and any postconviction motion “which states facts which if true
would constitute grounds for relief under another remedy shall be dis-
missed with prejudice.”91  Therefore, the court concluded, a defendant
may invoke the common-law procedure and move to withdraw his or
her plea after the conviction has become final only if the defendant
“does not and never could have asserted the basis of his or her collat-
eral attack under the Act.”92
The court further explained the defendants could only withdraw
their plea when their collateral attack is based on a constitutional is-
sue.93  Although in the past, the court refused to create or recognize a
non-statutory procedure by which defendants could raise claims re-
lated to criminal cases, such situations were different because the pro-
cedures at issue were “not constitutionally mandated.”94  The right to
effective assistance of counsel, however, is granted by the Sixth
Amendment and the court refused to deny defendants due process of
law “when such a right is at issue and there is no other means of vindi-
cating it.”95  The court then held:
86. Id. at 118, 251 N.W.2d at 739 (emphasis added).
87. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. 940, 947–48, 830 N.W.2d at 510 (citing State v. Yos-
Chiguil, 278 Neb. 591, 596, 772 N.W.2d 574, 578 (2009)) (noting that the court
would not address whether a common-law remedy for withdrawing a plea existed
because the issues was not presented to it).
88. Id. at 948–49, 830 N.W.2d at 510.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 948–49, 830 N.W.2d at 510 (citing NEB REV. STAT. § 29-3003 (Reissue
2008)).
92. Id. at 949, 830 N.W.2d at 510.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 949, 830 N.W.2d at 511 (citing State v. El-Tabech, 259 Neb. 509, 610
N.W.2d 737 (2000); State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999)).
95. Id.
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[T]here is a Nebraska common-law procedure under which a defendant may
move to withdraw a plea after his conviction has become final.  This procedure
is available only when (1) the Act is not, and never was, available as a means
of asserting the ground or grounds justifying withdrawing the plea and (2) a
constitutional right is at issue.  In sum, this common-law procedure exists to
safeguard a defendant’s rights in the very rare circumstance where due pro-
cess principles require a forum for the vindication of a constitutional right and
no other forum is provided by Nebraska law.96
Because Gonzalez was “in custody” while serving her probation and
she did not show that the Act was unavailable to her in the one-year
period following Padilla, Gonzalez’s sole remedy for withdrawing her
plea was to do so pursuant to the Act.97  As a result, the newly recog-
nized common-law procedure was not available to Gonzalez, and the
district court lacked jurisdiction to consider her motion.98
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Subsequent Common-Law Motions
The Nebraska Supreme Court has addressed the common-law pro-
cedure by which defendants can withdraw their pleas on only two oc-
casions since Gonzalez II. In State v. Osorio,99 the court held that,
because Padilla is not retroactive,100 defendants cannot use common-
law motions to withdraw pleas made before Padilla was decided.101
Osorio made his plea almost ten years before Padilla and therefore,
the constitutional right under which he claimed manifest injustice
was inapplicable as a matter of law.102
96. Id. at 949–50, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
97. Id. at 950, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
98. Id.
99. 286 Neb. 384, 837 N.W.2d 66 (2013).
100. In Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) the United States Supreme
Court held Padilla’s requirement that defense counsel advise defendants of the
risk of deportation arising from a guilty plea did not apply retroactively to cases
already final on direct review because Padilla announced a new rule under
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).  Under Teague, cases announce new rules
when they “break[ ] new ground or impose[ ] a new obligation on [the govern-
ment]” and those rules do not apply retroactively.  489 U.S. at 301.  When a case
does not announce a new rule and is “ ‘merely an application of the principle that
governed’ a prior decision to a different set of facts,” the case applies retroac-
tively. Chaidez, 133 S. Ct. at 1107 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 307); see also
State v. Merheb, 290 Neb. 83, 858 N.W.2d 226 (2015) (holding that Padilla is not
retroactive, and therefore defendant did not have a claim for manifest injustice
when his conviction became final over a year before the United States Supreme
Court decided Padilla).
101. Osorio sought to withdraw his plea from a 2002 conviction, which was made prior
to both the application of section 29-1819.02 and Padilla. Osorio, 286 Neb. at
384, 837 N.W.2d 66.  Osorio was deported as a result of his plea and sought to
withdraw it after he returned to the United States and learned that he again
faced deportation as a result of his conviction. Id. at 385, 837 N.W.2d at 67.
102. Id. at 389, 837 N.W.2d at 70.
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In contrast, in State v. Yuma103 the court concluded that Padilla
applied to the defendant’s plea.104  Yannick Yuma was granted asy-
lum and immigrated to the United States from Zaire in 2001.105  In
August 2009, Yuma was charged with one count of strangulation, a
Class IV felony, and one count of domestic assault in the first degree, a
Class III felony.106  In March 2010, pursuant to a plea agreement,
Yuma pled no contest to one count of attempted strangulation and one
count of domestic assault in the third degree, both Class I misdemean-
ors.107  Before accepting Yuma’s plea, the trial court gave him the
statutorily required advisement that his conviction may have negative
immigration consequences, and Yuma acknowledged that he under-
stood.108  On April 7, Yuma was sentenced to a year in prison on each
count, to be served concurrently, and given credit for 247 days served,
which resulted in Yuma being released from custody the same day he
was sentenced.109
In September 2011, Yuma filed a petition for writ of error coram
nobis.110  Before the court ruled on his petition, Yuma obtained leave
103. 286 Neb. 244, 835 N.W.2d 679 (2013).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 244, 835 N.W.2d at 681.




110. Id. A writ of error coram nobis exists in Nebraska under Chapter 49, Section 49-
101 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes, which adopts English common law to the
extent that it is not inconsistent with the United States Constitution, the Ne-
braska Constitution, or any law passed by the Nebraska Legislature. NEB. REV.
STAT. § 49-101 (Reissue 2010); State v. Sandoval, 288 Neb. 754, 757, 851 N.W.2d
656, 659 (2014).  Its purpose is to “bring before the court . . . matters of fact
which, if known at the time the judgment was rendered, would have prevented its
rendition.” Id. “The writ reaches only matters of fact unknown to the applicant
at the time of judgment, not discoverable through reasonable diligence, and
which are of the nature that, if known by the court, would have prevented entry
of judgment.” Id.  Since Yuma filed his writ, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
held that a writ of error coram nobis is not an appropriate method for a defendant
to raise ineffective assistance of counsel due to his counsel’s failure to advise him
of the immigration consequences of his plea.  State v. Diaz, 283 Neb. 414, 80
N.W.2d 891 (2012).  An ineffective assistance claim raises questions of fact and
questions of law, and a writ of error coram nobis cannot be used to address ques-
tions of law. Id. at 431, 808 N.W.2d at 896.  Further, whether or not a defen-
dant’s counsel has properly advised him or her of immigration consequences of
his or her plea does not prevent the court from rendering judgment. Id. at 422,
808 N.W.2d at 897.  Likewise, in Sandoval, the court concluded that a writ of
error coram nobis is not an appropriate method for a defendant to challenge the
trial court’s failure to properly advise the defendant as to the immigration conse-
quences of his plea.  288 Neb. at 758, 851 N.W.2d at 659.  A district court’s failure
to advise a defendant of the immigration consequences of his plea does not pre-
vent a court from accepting the defendant’s plea and entering a judgment of con-
viction; it provides a basis for the defendant to later move to vacate the judgment
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to amend and filed a common-law motion to withdraw his pleas and
vacate his convictions.111  Yuma alleged that he was denied ineffective
assistance under Padilla because his lawyer never asked him about
his citizenship or immigration status or informed him of the immigra-
tion consequences of his plea, “despite the fact that deportation [was]
presumptively mandatory.”112  Yuma also alleged that he was facing
deportation proceedings as a result of his convictions and that his
counsel’s ineffective assistance constituted a “manifest injustice”
which entitled him to withdraw his plea.113
The court denied Yuma’s motion after an evidentiary hearing, be-
cause Yuma was released from custody before seeking to withdraw his
plea.114  The district court questioned “whether a common-law Motion
to Withdraw Plea [was] available to a defendant whose sentence [had]
been completed.”115  The district court was unsure whether it had ju-
risdiction to hear the motion, and therefore denied it.116  Yuma ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court erred in concluding it lacked
jurisdiction to consider his motion.117
The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the district court’s finding,
concluding that the court did have jurisdiction to consider Yuma’s mo-
tion.  The Act was not, and never was, available to Yuma, because he
was sentenced to time served and immediately released.118  Further, a
constitutional right was at issue—Yuma entered his plea on March 9,
2010, before Padilla was decided, but was not sentenced until April 7,
2010, about a week after the Padilla decision.119  Because Yuma’s con-
victions were not final when Padilla was decided, Padilla’s rule that
defense counsel must inform a defendant when his or her conviction
carries a risk of deportation applied to Yuma.120  The court remanded
Yuma’s case to the district court to determine whether Yuma’s motion
was timely and whether he had established by clear and convincing
evidence that withdrawing his plea was necessary to correct a mani-
fest injustice.121  However, the court did not define when such a mo-
tion is timely.
and withdraw his or her plea if the defendant shows that the advisement was not
given, and the defendant faces an immigration consequence as a result of the plea
and subsequent conviction. Id. at 758, 851 N.W.2d at 659–60.
111. Yuma, 286 Neb. at 245, 835 N.W.2d at 681.
112. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 246, 835 N.W.2d at 681 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 246, 835 N.W.2d at 682.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 247, 835 N.W.2d at 682.
119. Id. at 249, 835 N.W.2d at 684.
120. Id. at 248–49, 835 N.W.2d at 683–84.
121. Id. at 249, 835 N.W.2d at 684.
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B. The Timeliness Inquiry
The Nebraska Supreme Court has not specified how long after con-
viction defendants may raise common-law motions to withdraw their
pleas.  The court did not specify a timing requirement in Gonzalez II
and only briefly alluded to one in Gonzalez I, stating that, “[a] motion
for withdrawal is timely if made with due diligence, considering the
nature of the allegations therein, and is not necessarily barred be-
cause it was made subsequent to judgment or sentence.”122  Whether
this “due diligence” requirement is good law is unclear.  First, the rule
is dicta in an opinion that has since been withdrawn.123  Second, the
court’s only citation for this proposition was State v. Evans, which is
also no longer good law.124
In Evans, the Nebraska Supreme Court applied the American Bar
Association Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, including 2.1(i),
which provides that a motion for withdrawal is timely if made with
due diligence.125  In State v. Minshall, however, the court expressly
disapproved any statements appearing in prior opinions of the court
that the ABA standards govern disposition of a defendant’s request to
withdraw a plea before sentencing.126  Although the court clarified
“the correct standard in Nebraska,” it discussed only guilty pleas
made prior to sentencing, not pleas made after sentencing like in Ev-
ans.127 Gonzalez I is the only case since Minshall disavowed the ABA
standards where the court has referenced the “due diligence” require-
ment, and the court withdrew that opinion in Gonzalez II.  In Gonza-
lez II, the court did not discuss when a common-law motion must be
filed to be considered timely, although it remanded Yuma’s case to the
district court with directions to consider whether his motion was
timely.  The district court looked to Gonzalez I and used Gonzalez I’s
“due diligence” requirement as a “touchstone” for its analysis of
whether Yuma’s motion was timely.128  Even accepting “due diligence”
as the requirement for when a common-law motion is timely filed, the
question remains as to what constitutes “due diligence.”129
122. Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. 1, 7, 807 N.W.2d 759, 766 (2012), withdrawn, 285 Neb. 940,
830 N.W.2d 504 (2013).
123. Id.
124. State v. Evans, 194 Neb. 559, 234 N.W.2d 199 (1975), abrogated by State v. Min-
shall, 227 Neb. 210, 416 N.W.2d 585 (1987).
125. Id. at 562, 234 N.W.2d at 201.
126. Minshall, 227 Neb. at 214, 416 N.W.2d at 588.
127. Id.
128. Order at 3, State v. Yuma, No. CR09-818 (Dist. Ct. of Lancaster Cnty., Neb. Mar.
11, 2014).
129. Although the “due diligence” standard has been referenced in cases where the
defendant sought to withdraw a plea after sentencing but before the judgment
became final for purposes of collateral attack, the Nebraska Supreme Court has
not defined exactly what constitutes due diligence.  In Evans, the Court did not
address whether the defendant’s motion was timely because he had not demon-
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The court has recognized that there are three methods by which a
defendant may move to withdraw his plea after his or her conviction
has become final: Section 29-1819.02, a postconviction motion pursu-
ant to the Act, or a common-law motion to withdraw a plea.130  The
time limitations imposed by either Section 29-1819.02 or the Act could
inform a court’s analysis of whether a common-law motion to with-
draw a plea is timely, but the timing requirements of the Act should
apply to common-law motions because the common-law remedy is in-
tended as an alternative to the Act.
1. Time Limitations Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819.02
The Legislature did not specify how long a defendant has to with-
draw his or her plea under Section 29-1819.02.  In State v. Rodriguez,
the Nebraska Supreme Court recently suggested that there is no time
limit on withdrawing pleas under the statute.131  On March 23, 2004,
Rodriguez pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a controlled sub-
stance—a Class I misdemeanor—pursuant to a plea agreement.132
Before the court accepted his plea, it gave the following warning:
[I]f a plea . . . is entered to a felony, besides the maximum sentence, there are
indirect consequences that will follow you the rest of your life . . . .  If you are
not a United States citizen, a plea of guilty may subject you to deportation.
There are any other number of those indirect consequences that may occur if
you plead guilty to a felony.133
Rodriguez did not move to withdraw his plea until February 2013,
shortly after he learned the immigration consequences of his plea
when immigration authorities took him into custody.134
The district court determined it did not have jurisdiction because
Rodriguez filed his motion after his sentence had been completed.135
The court relied on Rodriguez-Torres,136 explaining the Nebraska Su-
strated with clear and convincing evidence that he has suffered a manifest injus-
tice.  194 Neb. at 562, 234 N.W.2d at 201; see also State v. Copple, 218 Neb. 837,
359 N.W.2d 782 (1984) (concluding that the defendant failed to establish mani-
fest injustice by clear and convincing evidence and never addressing whether the
defendant’s motion was timely); State v. Kluge, 198 Neb. 115, 251 N.W.2d 737
(1977) (finding the defendant had not proved that withdrawal was necessary to
correct a manifest injustice and not addressing whether the defendant’s motion
was timely).  However, since these cases were always filed before the sentence
became final for purposes of a collateral attack, it seems reasonable that filing a
motion before the sentence is final constitutes due diligence.  This is not helpful
in determining whether a motion to withdraw a plea filed after the sentence has
become final is timely.
130. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. 940, 830 N.W.2d 504 (2013).
131. State v. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. 714, 850 N.W.2d 788 (2014).
132. Id. at 716, 850 N.W.2d at 790.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 716–17, 850 N.W.2d at 790–91.
135. Id. at 717, 850 N.W.2d at 791.
136. 275 Neb. 363, 746 N.W.2d 686 (2008).
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preme Court’s decision in Yos-Chiguil137 did not overrule Rodriguez-
Torres, stating that section 29-1819.02 “ ‘does not convey upon a court
jurisdiction’ to vacate a judgment or withdraw a plea to do ‘where a
party has already completed his or her sentence.’”138
The Nebraska Supreme Court determined that the district court
did in fact have jurisdiction and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings.139  The situation in Rodriguez-Torres was different from
Rodriguez’s case, because Rodriguez-Torres entered his plea before
June 20, 2002, while Rodriguez entered his plea after that date.  Sec-
tion 29-1819.02(3) does not create a procedure for withdrawing a plea
entered before July 20, 2002.140  As long as the plea was entered after
July 20, 2002, all a defendant must show to withdraw a plea under the
statute is “(1) that the court failed to give all or part of the advisement
and (2) that a defendant faces an immigration consequence which was
not included in the advisement given.”141  The court defining these
two elements as the sole requirements for withdrawing a plea, com-
bined with the fact that Rodriguez sought to withdraw his plea nine
years after he originally entered it, suggests that defendants can raise
claims under section 29-1819.02 indefinitely.142
2. Timing Requirements of the Nebraska Postconviction Act
In contrast, the Nebraska Postconviction Act contains very specific
limitations on when defendants can file motions.143  In Gonzalez II,
the Nebraska Supreme Court made clear that the common-law proce-
dure is an alternative to the Act.  The district court did not have juris-
diction over Gonzalez’s common-law motion because she could have
raised the claim under the Act.144  It was the Legislature’s intent in
passing the Act that “if a defendant had a collateral attack that could
be asserted under the Act, that Act is his or her sole remedy.”145  One
of the two requirements for a defendant bringing a common-law mo-
tion is that the Act “is not, and never was,” available to the defendant
as a means of asserting the grounds justifying withdrawal of his or her
137. 278 Neb. 591, 722 N.W.2d 574 (2009).
138. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. at 717, 850 N.W.2d at 791 (quoting Rodriguez-Torres, 275
Neb. at 367, 746 N.W.2d at 689).
139. Id. at 721, 850 N.W.2d at 793–94.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing State v. Medina-Liborio, 285 Neb. 636, 829 N.W.2d 96 (2013)).
142. See also State v. Chojolan, 288 Neb. 760, 851 N.W. 2d 661 (2014) (finding that the
district court had jurisdiction to consider the defendant’s motion to withdraw a
plea made in 2006).
143. See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text.
144. Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. 940, 946, 830 N.W.2d 504, 509 (2013).
145. Id. at 949, 830 N.W.2d at 510.  It is “[o]nly if a defendant does not and never could
have asserted the basis of his or her collateral attack under the Act may he or she
invoke the common-law procedure and move to withdraw a plea after the convic-
tion has become final.” Id.
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plea.146  Because the common-law motion is an alternative that is
available only when the Act is not available (unlike motions to with-
draw pleas pursuant to Section 29-1918.02 which are completely sepa-
rate from both postconviction and common-law motions), the same
timing requirements should apply.
The District Court of Lancaster County, Nebraska, agreed when
considering Yuma’s motion on remand.  The court noted that “[t]he
Legislature intended ‘that the Act [be] the primary procedure for
bringing collateral attacks based upon constitutional principles’”147
and the “presence of the ‘due diligence’ requirement in subparagraph
(4)(b) of the Postconviction Act makes it a meaningful guidepost in
determining the timeliness of Yuma’s motion to withdraw plea.”148
The court held that to be considered timely, a motion to withdraw a
plea must be filed within one year from the later of:
(1) The date the judgment or conviction became final by the conclusion of a
direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal;
(2) The date on which the factual predicate of the constitutional claim or
claims alleged could have been discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence; or
(3) The date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Nebraska Supreme
Court, if the newly recognized right has been made applicable retroactively to
cases on postconviction collateral review . . . .149
The district court also declined to adopt Yuma’s proposed “tolling
rule”—that is, a “timeliness rule which is triggered by the occurrence
of actual immigration consequences” and permits defendants to with-
draw their pleas within a year of immigration consequences material-
izing, even if they were warned of the possibility of such consequences
before pleading guilty.150
Although Yuma’s conviction became final on May 7, 2010, he did
not file his motion until September 2011—two months after he was
detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) but more
than a year after his conviction became final.151  The U.S. Supreme
Court decided Padilla on March 31, 2010, shortly after Yuma entered
146. Id. at 940, 830 N.W.2d at 505.
147. Order at 4, State v. Yuma, No. CR09-818 (Dist. Ct. of Lancaster Cnty., Neb. Mar.
11, 2014) (quoting Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. at 949, 830 N.W.2d at 509).
148. Id. (recalling Gonzalez I’s original requirement that timely motions for with-
drawal be made with due diligence). See also Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. 1, 1, 807
N.W.2d 759, 760 (2012) (“[A] motion for withdrawal of a plea of guilty or no con-
test is timely if made with due diligence, considering the nature of the allegations
therein . . . .”).
149. Order at 6, State v. Yuma, No. CR09-818 (numbers added).
150. Id. at 5.  Yuma based this argument on the fact that while he was advised that
his pleas could result in his removal from the United States, he was not advised
that the convictions would result in his removal. Id. at 4.
151. Id. at 5, 8.
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his plea on March 9, but Yuma did not file his initial writ of error
coram nobis until approximately one year and six months after Pa-
dilla.152  Yuma argued that he did not discover the immigration con-
sequences of his plea and his trial counsel’s ineffectiveness until he
was detained by ICE.153  At the time of his plea, Yuma had several
misdemeanor convictions that had not resulted in removal proceed-
ings.154  Each time, Yuma received the standard warnings that depor-
tation may occur as a result of his convictions, so he argued that he
did not fail to exercise due diligence “because experience taught him
no immigration consequences would materialize.”155
Yuma argued that Yos-Chiguil supported his tolling argument, be-
cause the Nebraska Supreme Court “recognized that a defendant who
was not advised ‘of the immigration consequences of a plea-based con-
viction may not be aware of those consequences until after the convic-
tion becomes final and the consequences materialize.’”156  The district
court was not persuaded by this argument, noting that Yos-Chiguil
had not received the advisement required by Section 29-1819.02(1),
whereas Yuma received the advisement “but he assumed . . . such con-
sequences would not materialize because . . . the consequences had not
materialized following past advisements and convictions.”157  The
court concluded, “[a] timeliness rule which is tolled until actual immi-
gration consequences materialize . . . is difficult to reconcile with the
‘due diligence’ requirement and would render superfluous the notice-
based statutory advisement on immigration consequences.”158
The Nebraska Supreme Court recently rejected a similar argument
in State v. Mamer.159  Mamer argued that he could not have raised his
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Act because he was
152. Id. at 7.
153. Id. at 5.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing State v. Yos-Chiguil, 278 Neb. 591, 596, 772 N.W.2d 574, 579 (2009)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 5–6.
159. 289 Neb. 92, 853 N.W.2d 517 (2014).  The defendant, Malual Mamer, pleaded
guilty to attempted sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to 12–18
months in prison with credit for 248 days served. Id. at 93, 853 N.W.2d at 520.
As a result, Mamer was only incarcerated for three weeks following his conviction
and was discharged on October 7, 2011. Id. at 94, 853 N.W.2d at 520.  Mamer
filed a motion to withdraw his plea on February 9, 2012. Id. In his motion,
Mamer alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him that
deportation was presumptively mandatory for a conviction of attempted first de-
gree sexual assault under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Id. Mamer alleged that
he pleaded guilty without knowing the presumptively mandatory deportation
consequences of his conviction and that it would have been rational for him to
reject such a plea had he been properly advised of the immigration consequences.
Id. at 94, 853 N.W.2d at 521.  Mamer alleged that his plea resulted in the initia-
tion of removal proceedings against him, as the U.S. Department of Homeland
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no longer in custody by the time the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security informed him of its intention to begin removal proceed-
ings.160  Mamer argued that his claim did not arise until after he was
released from custody and learned that he would be deported.161  The
court observed that Mamer “view[ed] the factual predicate as includ-
ing the actual commencement of removal proceedings”162 but that he
could have discovered the immigration consequences of his plea while
incarcerated.163
The court distinguished between discovering the facts underlying a
postconviction claim and discovering that those facts are actiona-
ble.164  Mamer’s ignorance of the Padilla decision did “not concern the
factual predicate for his ineffective assistance claim” but instead “con-
cern[ed] only the legal significance of the relevant objective facts.”165
It was the existence of the deportation law—not the immigration offi-
cials’ execution of that law—that formed the factual predicate for
Mamer’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.166 Padilla does not
require trial counsel to “predict the future execution of existing law” or
“whether the law will change,” but only to advise clients of what the
law currently states.167
The court determined that Mamer could have discovered the appli-
cable deportation law with due diligence during his brief incarcera-
tion.168  Mamer received the advisement required by Section 29-
1819.02 and acknowledged that he understood it.169  This advisement
“put Mamer on notice of potential deportation laws” that he could
have discovered with due diligence while he was in custody.170
Security sent him a notice to appear on October 7, 2011, two days before Mamer
moved to withdraw his plea. Id.
160. Id. at 97, 853 N.W.2d at 522–23.
161. Id. at 97–98, 853 N.W.2d at 523.
162. Id. at 98, 853 N.W.2d at 523.
163. Id. at 99, 853 N.W.2d at 523.  The fact that the defendant did not have an attor-
ney while in custody did not change the court’s conclusion that the defendant
could have discovered the immigration consequences of his plea with due dili-
gence. Id. Pro se inmates are held to the same standards as inmates represented
by new counsel in exercising due diligence in discovering potential claims. Id. at
99, 853 N.W.2d at 523 (citing State v. Sums, 277 Neb. 192, 761 N.W.2d 527
(2009)).
164. Id.  The court used the timing requirements of the Act because the common-law
procedure did not apply since the defendant could have discovered the facts un-
derlying his claim while in custody and thus, the common-law procedure was
never available to him. Id. at 98–100, 853 N.W.2d at 523–24.




169. Id. at 100, 853 N.W.2d at 525.
170. Id. Because Mamer could have discovered his claim with due diligence while in-
carcerated, Mamer could have raised his claim under the Act, and therefore the
common-law motion was not available to him. Id. at 101, 853 N.W.2d at 525.
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Mamer indicates that Yuma’s claim was not tolled until he learned
that his plea would result in actual immigration consequences but in-
stead arose when Yuma was warned by the court that immigration
consequences may arise and failed to investigate those consequences
until after they materialized.
In Yuma’s case, the district court correctly determined that the
timing requirements of the Act should apply.  If a defendant does not
receive the statutory advisement required by Section 29-1819.02, the
defendant should be able to withdraw his or her plea whenever the
immigration consequences apply.  In fact, the occurrence of negative
immigration consequences of which the defendant was not warned is a
prerequisite for bringing such a claim.171  There are only two require-
ments for withdrawing a plea under Section 29-1819.02 and one is
that the defendant faces immigration consequences that he or she was
not warned about in the advisement given pursuant to Section 29-
1819.02.172  Therefore, a defendant cannot move to withdraw a plea
under Section 29-1819.02 until the negative immigration conse-
quences materialize, whether those consequences materialize a year
after the defendant’s plea or ten years after the defendant’s plea.
This indefinite period in which defendants can raise their claims is
supported by the Legislature’s intent that Section 29-1819.02 “pro-
mote fairness” for defendants whose convictions may result in their
removal from the United States.173  “This objective would not be
achieved by limiting the application of Section 29-1819.02 to those de-
fendants whose sentences have not been completed and excluding
those who had completed their sentences.”174  The statute “was en-
acted to address immigration consequences that could arise subse-
quent to a plea of guilty regardless of whether the sentence imposed
as a result of the guilty plea has been completed.”175  As a result, the
Nebraska Supreme Court appears to have concluded that there is no
limit on when a motion to withdraw a plea pursuant to Section 29-
1819.02 can be filed, as long as the trial court failed to give all or part
of the required advisement before accepting the defendant’s plea and
the defendant faces an immigration consequence that was not in-
cluded in the advisement given by the court.176
Defendants seeking to withdraw their plea using a common-law
motion, however, do not allege that the trial court failed to warn them
of the immigration consequences.177  Instead, a common-law motion,
171. State v. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. 714, 723, 850 N.W.2d 788, 794 (2014).
172. Id.
173. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1819.03 (Reissue 2008).
174. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. at 725, 850 N.W.2d at 795.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 723, 850 N.W.2d at 794.
177. See id. at 726, 850 N.W.2d at 796 (stating that because the court had jurisdiction
to consider Rodriguez’s motion under Section 29-1819.02, the court did not need
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as it has been used so far,178 is based on trial counsel’s ineffectiveness
in warning a defendant of the immigration consequences of his or her
plea.179  Normally, such claims would be brought under the Act, but
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel can only be raised in a com-
mon-law motion when the Act is not, and never was, available to the
defendant.180  The common-law motion is clearly a substitute to the
Act and therefore, the same timing requirements should apply.
Defendants may argue that, similar to claims raised under Section
29-1819.02, they should be able to bring their common-law motion
whenever the negative immigration consequences of their plea materi-
alize.181  However, defendants bringing common-law motions do not
allege that no one ever warned them of the possible immigration con-
sequences of their plea, merely that their trial counsel did not warn
them of the possible immigration consequences of their plea.  Unlike a
scenario where the court did not give the advisement required by Sec-
tion 29-1819.02, when there is no record that the defendant was ever
warned about the possible immigration consequences, the record
shows that the trial court warned Yuma of the immigration conse-
quences.182  Unlike defendants who did not receive warnings from the
court, defendants alleging ineffective assistance of counsel knew the
immigration consequences of their plea when they pleaded and did not
first become aware of possibility that they could be deported when ICE
initiated deportation proceedings.183
to consider whether the common-law remedy was available to Rodriguez); see also
Gonzalez II, 285 Neb. 940, 945, 830 N.W.2d 504, 507 (2013) (finding that Gonza-
lez was advised of her rights as required by Section 29-1819.02 and thus she did
not and could not move to withdraw her plea pursuant to Section 29-1819.02).
178. Although all of the cases in which defendants have sought to use the common-law
procedure to withdraw their plea involve ineffective assistance of counsel based
on trial counsel’s failure to advise the defendant of the immigration consequences
of his or her plea, defendants could use a common-law motion for any “constitu-
tional right at issue” as long as they could have never raised the claim under the
Act. See Gonzalez II, at 949–50, 830 N.W.2d at 511.
179. Effective assistance of counsel is a constitutional right. See, e.g., State v. Lotter,
255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998) (reinforcing that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees every criminal defendant the right to effective assistance of counsel).
180. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
181. Mamer made this argument in State v. Mamer, 289 Neb. 92, 97, 853 N.W.2d 517,
523 (2014) to justify why he did not file a postconviction motion while in custody.
Yuma tried to make a similar argument by arguing that the Act’s timing require-
ments should apply to common-law motions but that the one-year period under
which defendants could bring claims should be tolled until the defendant discov-
ers the actual immigration consequences of his plea.  Order at 5, State v. Yuma,
No. CR09-818 (Dist. Ct. of Lancaster Cnty., Neb. Mar. 11, 2014).
182. Yuma admitted he had received the standard warnings that his convictions may
result in removal from the United States, but ignored them “because experience
taught him no immigration consequences would materialize.”  Order at 5, State v.
Yuma, No. CR09-818.
183. The district court wrote:
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Allowing defendants to file motions—whether postconviction or
common-law—indefinitely “frustrates case finality and allows for
abuses where . . . motions are filed after important parties relevant to
the issues raised are no longer available”184  To decide a motion to
withdraw a plea under Section 29-1819.02, the court merely needs to
look back at the record to see the contents of the immigration advise-
ment given to the defendant before his plea.  Resolving postconviction
and common-law motions, in contrast, may require the court to look
beyond the record in an evidentiary hearing with the defendant’s
counsel to determine what warnings were given.  Allowing defendants
an indefinite period under which to assert their claims disadvantages
the State since evidence or witnesses may be lost.185  This interest in
finality motivated the legislature to limit the time in which a defen-
dant can file a postconviction motion and should similarly limit when
a defendant can file a common-law motion to withdraw a plea.
V. CONCLUSION
In recognizing a common-law procedure under which defendants
can withdraw their pleas, the Nebraska Supreme Court recognized a
limited procedure, available in very limited circumstances.186  The
procedure is only available when the Postconviction Act is not, and
never was, available to the defendant.187  The Nebraska Supreme
Court has not yet determined when common-law motions must be
Clearly, Yuma was advised that his convictions could result in his re-
moval from the United States, but he assumed such consequences would
not materialize because—as he admits—the consequences had not mate-
rialized following past advisements and convictions.  This is not a case
where Yuma received no warnings or advisements regarding possible ad-
verse immigration consequences, nor is it a case where Yuma received
false assurances he would not be deported by pleading no contest to a
misdemeanor.
Id.  The Nebraska Supreme Court dismissed Yuma’s appeal without writing an
opinion.  State v. Yuma, No. S-14-308 (dismissed Nov. 14, 2014).  Similarly, in
Mamer, 289 Neb. at 100, 853 N.W.2d at 525, the court concluded that “[t]he ad-
visement [required by section 29-1819.02], which Mamer acknowledged he under-
stood, put Mamer on notice of potential deportation laws.” Id.
184. INTRODUCER’S STATEMENT OF INTENT: LB 137, 102nd Neb. Leg., 1st Sess. (Feb. 2,
2011).  Prior to LB 137 imposing a one-year limitation on a defendant’s ability to
file a postconviction motion, there was no limitation. Id.  The district court recog-
nized that the State’s interest in finality is just as strong in common-law motions
as in the postconviction motions to which LB 137 referred.  Order at 6, n.4, State
v. Yuma, No. CR09-818.
185. See State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 183–84, 595 N.W.2d 917, 924 (1999), where
the court noted that “ ‘[i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confi-
dence in the integrity of our procedures’ and inevitably delay and impair the or-
derly administration of justice,” and that “the concern with finality served by the
limitation on collateral attack has special force.” Id.
186. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
187. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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filed, mentioning “due diligence” only in passing in a decision that the
Court has since withdrawn.188  Whether the timing for bringing such
a motion is “due diligence” or something else, Nebraska courts should
look to the Nebraska Postconviction Act to decide whether defendants
have timely filed their motions.  The common-law motion is a substi-
tute available to defendants only when they cannot raise their claims
in a postconviction motion, and therefore the same timing require-
ments should apply.  Accordingly, defendants should be required to
file their motion within one year of:
1) The date the judgment or conviction became final by the conclusion of a
direct appeal or the expiration of the time for filing a direct appeal;
2) The date on which the factual predicate of the constitutional claim or
claims alleged could have been discovered through the exercise of due dili-
gence; or
3) The date on which a constitutional claim asserted was initially recog-
nized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Nebraska Supreme
Court, if the newly recognized right has been made applicable retroactively to
cases on postconviction collateral review.189
This one-year rule should apply regardless of whether the defendant
actually faces negative immigration consequences as a result of his or
conviction, because the defendant was warned that such immigration
consequences could result.  The interest of promoting fairness is not as
strong as when the court did not warn a defendant and the interest in
finality weighs heavily on imposing some limitations on when defend-
ants can withdraw their pleas.
188. See Gonzalez I, 283 Neb. 1, 807 N.W.2d 759 (2012), withdrawn, 285 Neb. 940, 830
N.W.2d 504 (2013).
189. Order at 6, State v. Yuma, No. CR09-818 (Dist. Ct. of Lancaster Cnty, Neb. Mar.
11, 2014) (numbers added).
